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FOURTH AMENDMENT - SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS
THAT EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A HOME MAY
BE USED AGAINST A PRESENT AND
OBJECTING OCCUPANT AFTER THEY ARE
ARRESTED AND REMOVED FROM THE
HOME AND A CO-OCCUPANT WITH
AUTHORITY CONSENTS TO THE SEARCH.
Amanda Dodds
N United States v. Henderson, a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit
held that evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a home con-
ducted with the consent of a co-occupant may be used against a pre-
sent and objecting occupant after they were arrested and removed from
the home.1 This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit erroneously found
that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated and
failed to properly apply Supreme Court precedent. In Georgia v. Ran-
dolph, the Supreme Court held "that a warrantless search of a shared
dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically
present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis
of consent given to the police by another resident."' 2 By distinguishing
the Henderson case from Randolph, the Seventh Circuit has made the
holding in Randolph meaningless, as a police officer could simply arrest
the present and objecting occupant in order to use the consent of a co-
occupant to search the premises.
In late November 2003, police officers responded to a report of domes-
tic abuse at the home of James Henderson (Henderson) and Patricia
Henderson (Mrs. Henderson).3 The police found Mrs. Henderson stand-
ing in front of the home, and she told the police that Henderson had
choked her and removed her from the house. 4 Before the police entered
1. United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776, 783-84 (7th Cir. 2008).
2. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006).
3. Henderson, 536 F.3d at 777.
4. Id.
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the house using a key provided by the Hendersons' teenage son, Mrs.
Henderson informed the police that her husband had weapons in the
house and had previously been arrested on drug and weapons charges. 5
The officers used the key to enter the home and found Henderson in the
living room.6 Henderson explicitly told the officers to leave the house,
which constituted an objection to a search. 7 Police officers arrested Hen-
derson and took him to the police station.8 After Henderson was re-
moved from the home, Mrs. Henderson signed a consent form allowing
the police to search the home. 9 During the search, police discovered
crack cocaine, drug-dealing paraphernalia, multiple guns, ammunition, a
machete, a crossbow, and an explosive device.10 Mrs. Henderson also
consented to a search of the family car, during which the police uncov-
ered additional crack cocaine."
The Government filed charges against Henderson in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois for possession of crack cocaine with the intent to dis-
tribute, various firearms-related offenses, and possession of an explosive
device.' 2 Henderson moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the
search of the house, arguing that the Supreme Court's holding in Ran-
dolph required the suppression. 13 The district court, relying on Ran-
dolph, granted Henderson's motion to suppress.14 The court reasoned
that the evidence obtained from the search of the home "was not incident
to the defendant's arrest, but was clearly evidentiary in nature.' 5 The
district court re-affirmed its decision to suppress the evidence seized from
the defendant's home, however, it denied the defendant's motion to sup-
press the evidence seized in the car.' 6
The Government appealed, and the Seventh Circuit, in a 2-1 decision,
reversed the district court's suppression of the evidence after reviewing
the matter de novo.17 The Seventh Circuit relied on the limiting language
in Randolph that the Supreme Court intended "to maintain the validity of
Matlock and Rodriguez"'8 and Justice Breyer's concurrence in Randolph,
in which he stated that the opinion in Randolph was case specific and
"does not apply where the objector is not present and objecting."' 9 Fur-
ther, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the reasoning of the Eighth Cir-
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 778-79.




12. Id.; United States v. Henderson, No. 04 CR 697, 2006 WL 3469538, at *1 (N.D. I11.
Nov. 29, 2006).
13. Henderson, 536 F.3d at 778; Henderson, 2006 WL 3469538, at *1.
14. Henderson, 2006 WL 3469538, at *1.
15. Id.
16. Id. at *3.
17. Henderson, 536 F.3d at 779, 785.
18. Id. at 785.
19. Id. at 784 (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 (2006)).
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cuit's opinion in United States v. Hudspeth that "the contemporaneous
presence of the objecting and consenting cotenants [is] indispensable to
the decision in Randolph." 20
The Henderson court acknowledged that "[t]he sole issue on appeal
[was] whether Randolph requires exclusion of evidence obtained in a
warrantless search of a home after a present and objecting occupant is
arrested and removed from the home and a co-occupant with authority
consents to the search, a2 1 or in other words, "[d]oes a refusal of consent
by a present and objecting resident remain effective to bar the voluntary
consent of another resident with authority after the objector is arrested
and is therefore no longer present and objecting?" 22 The Seventh Cir-
cuit answered in the negative, holding that Randolph "applies only when
the defendant is both present and objects to the search of his home. '23
Although Henderson was initially home and objecting, "his objection lost
its force when he was validly arrested and taken to jail."'24
The decision in Henderson extends from an exception to the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures." 25 One exception to the Fourth
Amendment is voluntary consent given by individuals that possess, or the
police reasonably believe to possess, shared occupancy of the premises. 26
The Supreme Court's decision in Randolph limits the application of this
exception, holding that "a physically present co-occupant's stated refusal
to permit entry prevails [over another co-occupant's consent], rendering
the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him."'27
In its holding, the Henderson Court focuses its analysis on the limiting
language in Randolph as well as Justice Breyer's concurrence in Ran-
dolph. The majority in Randolph specifically upheld the court's decisions
in Matlock and Rodriguez by stating that its decision
required [the court] to "draw[ I a fine line" between a defendant who
is both present and objecting and one who is either not present
(though nearby) or present but not objecting: "[I]f a potential defen-
dant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects,
the co-tenant's permission does not suffice for a reasonable search,
whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in
the threshold colloquy, loses out."'28
20. Id. at 776, 783. See also United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 955 (8th Cir.
2008).
21. Henderson, 536 F.3d at 779.
22. Id. at 781 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. at 777.
24. Id. at 777.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
186 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); SCHNECKLOTH v. Bus-
TAMONTE, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
27. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106.
28. Henderson, 536 F.3d at 780 (quoting Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121).
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Further, Justice Breyer's concurrence in Randolph stated that the holding
was case specific and that "[t]he Court's opinion does not apply where
the objector is not present and objecting. '29
Additionally, the Henderson court noted that although the issue was
one of first impression, the Seventh Circuit had recently declined to ex-
tend Randolph in a case where police obtained evidence during a search
of the suspect's house, consented to by a co-occupant, when the suspect
had objected to the search several weeks earlier.30 The Seventh Circuit
held that the evidence from the search could be used against the suspect
because he was not physically present when the co-occupant consented
and the district court had concluded that the officers "had no active role
in securing [his] absence. ' 31 Further, the Circuit noted that the two other
circuits that have addressed the issue are split in their decisions.32 The
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Hudspeth held that Randolph did not
extend to the present issue and that its application was limited to the
particular facts in Randolph; thus it held that the search was valid despite
the suspect's objection, because he was not present and objecting at the
time of the consent. 33 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Murphy extended Randolph, holding that "[o]nce a co-tenant
has registered his objection, his refusal to grant consent remains effective
barring some objective manifestation that he has changed his position
and no longer objects."' 34 The Henderson court found the reasoning of
the Eighth Circuit persuasive and held that "the contemporaneous pres-
ence of the objecting and consenting cotenants [i]s indispensable to the
decision in Randolph.' '35 The court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Murphy, arguing that it "reads the presence requirement out
of Randolph, expanding its holding beyond its express terms. 36
In dissent, Judge Rovner argued "that Henderson's objection survived
his involuntary removal from the home, thus precluding the search in the
absence of a warrant. '37 Henderson's arrest is the only reason why he
was not "present and objecting" to the search of his home.38 Judge
Rovner stated that he would have held that Randolph "is a limited hold-
ing that 'expressly disinvites' any application to cases with materially dif-
ferent facts," and thus agreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Groves.39 However, as is the case in Henderson, when the police are re-
sponsible for removing the objecting tenant from the premises, "his ob-
29. Id. at 781 (quoting Randolph, 547 U.S. at 126 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
30. Id. (citing United States v. Groves, 530 F.3d 506, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2008)).
31. Id. (quoting Groves, 530 F.3d at 512 (7th Cir. 2008)).
32. Id. at 781.
33. Id. at 782 (citing United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008)).
34. Id. at 782-83 (quoting United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir.
2008)).
35. Id. at 783.
36. Id. at 784.
37. Id. at 786 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 786-87 (quoting United States v. Groves, 530 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2008)).
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jection ought to be treated as a continuing one that trumps his co-tenant's
consent and so precludes a search of the premises unless and until the
police obtain a warrant. ' 40 The fact that Henderson's arrest was lawful
does not alter the analysis, since "[a]n individual does not lose all Fourth
Amendment rights upon his arrest." 41 Since the "police may not remove
a tenant in order to prevent him from objecting to a search of his
home," 42 they cannot arrest the tenant and ignore an objection he has
already made.43 Further, Judge Rovner noted that some questions, such
as how long one's objection would remain valid, are hard questions, but
these questions were not at issue in the present case and did not need to
be decided at that time.an
As the dissent correctly identified, the majority failed to properly con-
sider the effect of Henderson's arrest on the application of Randolph.
Until the moment of Henderson's arrest, he was both present and ob-
jecting to the search of his home, and his involuntary removal from the
premises should have precluded the search and required suppression of
the evidence found. 45 Support for this conclusion can be found in Ran-
dolph itself, where the Supreme Court states that "[s]o long as there is no
evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant
from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection. ' 46 Thus,
as the Ninth Circuit stated, "[i]f the police cannot prevent a co-tenant
from objecting to a search through arrest, surely they cannot arrest a co-
tenant and then seek to ignore an objection he has already made. '47
Considering this, the facts in Henderson are identical to those in Ran-
dolph and thus, the search should have been held to be a violation of
Henderson's Fourth Amendment rights. Additionally, this analysis dis-
tinguishes Henderson from Groves because the police actively secured
Henderson's absence by arresting him, whereas in Groves they did not.48
Further, the majority misinterpreted the limiting language in Ran-
dolph. The limiting language simply upheld the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Matlock and Rodriguez. In both Matlock and Rodriguez, the
defendants never voiced an objection to the search.49 The court failed to
distinguish between lack of consent and express objection, yet these two
concepts are not synonymous. 50 Because this language does not extend
40. Id. at 787.
41. Id. at 788 (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336 (1990)).
42. Id. (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006)).
43. Id. (quoting United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2008)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 786.
46. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121 (2006).
47. United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2008).
48. Compare Henderson, 536 F.3d at 778 with United States v. Groves, 530 F.3d 506,
512 (7th Cir. 2008).
49. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 180 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 166 (1974).




the application of Matlock and Rodriguez to situations where the suspect
has expressly objected to a search, Randolph should have controlled.
Additionally, the majority's reliance on Justice Breyer's concurrence in
Randolph is misplaced. First, a concurrence is not binding precedent and
should not be given significant weight. Second, Justice Breyer stated that
these cases should be analyzed by looking at the "totality of the circum-
stances. '51 There is no indication that Justice Breyer's statement that
"[t]he Court's opinion does not apply where the objector is not present
and objecting," applies to a situation in which the present and objecting
occupant is arrested and removed from the premises and then a co-occu-
pant consents to the search.52 It is illogical to conclude that either the
limiting language in the majority opinion or the concurrence extends to
this situation.
Additionally, the majority's reliance on Hudspeth is also misplaced.
The facts in Hudspeth were materially different than the facts in Ran-
dolph, as well as those in Henderson. In Hudspeth, the police arrested
Hudspeth after uncovering child pornography on his work computer
while executing a search warrant of his office. 53 At the time, the police
officer asked Hudspeth for permission to search his home computer,
which Hudspeth denied.5 4 The police arrested Hudspeth at his office,
transported him to jail, and later received reluctant consent from his wife
to search their home computer, on which they found additional evi-
dence. 55 These facts differ from those in Randolph and Henderson be-
cause the suspect was never present and objecting at the premises that
were to be searched. The facts in Hudspeth are more similar to those in
Matlock and Rodriquez because a suspect was not present to enforce his
objection to the search. These facts differ from Henderson because the
suspect was present and objecting until the police removed him from the
premises against his will. Otherwise, he would have remained present
and objecting. Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Randolph should
have controlled.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit's holding in Henderson renders the Su-
preme Court's decision in Randolph meaningless. If the police can over-
ride a suspect's objection to the search of his home by simply arresting
him and receiving consent from another co-occupant, there are very few
situations in which Randolph could be applied. The Seventh Circuit read
the Randolph decision too narrowly. Thus, Randolph should have re-
quired the exclusion of evidence obtained in a warrantless search of a
home after a present and objecting occupant is arrested and involuntarily
removed from his home and another co-occupant with authority consents
to the search. This is not to say that in every situation in which a suspect
51. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 126 (Breyer, J., concurring).
52. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. See Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 955.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 955-56.
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objects to the search of his house that the police may never secure a valid
search with the consent of an authorized co-tenant. The decisions should
be limited to their particular facts, and other cases should be determined
on a case-by-case basis, until the Supreme Court gives further guidance.
In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit erred in its decision to allow evi-
dence secured during a warrantless search of a suspect's home, where he
was present and objecting until the police arrested and removed him from
the premises and subsequently received consent from a co-occupant to
search premises. The court misinterpreted the limiting language in Ran-
dolph, over-emphasized Justice Breyer's concurrence and took it out of
context, and relied on cases whose facts were materially different. In-
stead, the court should have followed Randolph. The facts in Henderson
were identical to those in Randolph, up until the police arrested the sus-
pect and removed him from the premises. Relying on the Supreme
Court's language, the rationale in Randolph should be extended to Hen-
derson because the police should not be allowed to secure a suspect's
absence in order to prevent an objection to a search. This extension
would prevent the Supreme Court's decision in Randolph from losing
precedential value.
2009]
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